

*** ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ***
***** This Message Has Been Altered *****

Page 1 of 2

DSD

07-M-1516
330-016 001
Box 4
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
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FM UNDERSECDEF FOR POLICY WASHINGTON DC FOR SECDEF
TO ZEN/HQ COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTH BAGHDAD
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHINGTON DC
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ NONE-NR

SUBJ: TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - WASHINGTON COMMENT

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

FROM: UNDERSECDEF FOR POLICY WASHINGTON DC FOR SECDEF
1. ~~10~~ RECEIVED YOUR DRAFT OF THE TRANSITIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
(TAL) DATED 29 JANUARY 2004 AND READ IT WITH INTEREST. BECAUSE THE
USG IS STILL WORKING OUT HOW IT WANTS TO HANDLE
POST-SOVEREIGNTY-TRANSFER SECURITY ARRANGEMENT ISSUES WITH THE
IRAQIS, CPA INTERACTIONS WITH THE GOVERNING COUNCIL ON THE TAL SHOULD
BE GUIDED BY THE FOLLOWING:



DRAFTED BY: GND/THA/NSEA NG
CLEARED BY: NSC: CRICE
NSC: RBLACKWILL
OVP: ILIBBY
OVP: VNULAND

JS 1.4 (d)

OSD - SECDEF CABLE DISTRIBUTION:

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005
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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 03 2014

14-M-1216
11-M-1617

Office of the Secretary of Defense SUSL 5552
Chief, RDD, LSD, WHS
Date: 03 DEC 2014 Authority: EO 13526
Declassify: _____ Deny in Full: _____
Declassify in Part: _____
Reason: 1.4(a)(2)
MDR: 14-M-1216


DOS

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Reviewed Chief, RDD, WHS
IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 03 2014

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CFC-I

Responsibility for Iraqi Security Forces



- Single Accountable Entity**: Only the military has the capability and capacity to carry this out across Iraq
- Span of Control**: Military is unique; structure and deployment across Iraq
- Security**: Training and operations are inextricably linked in a complex operational environment
- Resource Management**: Single organization linking training, logistical reach and operations
- Training Efficiency**: Military and police forces training separate, but parallel; Civilian police trained by civilian police trainers
- Legitimacy**: Inherent in CFC-I as a Coalition structure
- Unity of Effort**: Essential to link MoI, MoD, and CFC-I in current complex environment and state of emergency with consistent policy framework

~~SECRET~~
DRAFT

OSD Policy/J-5
3 Feb 2004
12:00 PM

Iraqi Police: Reconciling Elkenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments

SD key considerations:

- The USG "belly-button" for train and equip work is CJTF-7 (or its successor, the Combined Force Command-Iraq)
- SD can look to CFC-I Commander, not to the new US ambassador, to ensure results on police train and equip.
- Policy issues about substance of police training – e.g., curriculum, amount of training, etc. -- continue to be handled by State Department experts.

Bremer's key considerations:

- Maintain principle of civilian control of the police.
- Do not disrupt police training apparatus now in place.

Proposed way ahead:

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

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JS 1.4 (a)

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Date: DEC 03 2014

February 3, 2004, 1:00 PM

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 03 2014

Iraq Security Assessment Team

February 3, 2004

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Background

- Assigned two major tasks
 - Assess roles, missions, requirements, and resourcing of Iraqi Security Forces (Police, Civil Defense Corps, Army, Border Police and Facilities Protection)
 - Evaluate overall command and control relationships
- Included representatives from OSD, State, JCS, CPA, CENTCOM, and UK MOD
- Extensive meetings with CPA, CJTF-7, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi leaders

Key Observations

- Nature of the threat and internal security situation
- CENTCOM strategic concept
 - Local → provincial → national “hand-off”
 - Requires certification of Iraqi security forces
- Status of Iraqi security forces and institutions
 - Need for quality, quantity and speed
- CPA and CJTF-7 capacities
 - Training capacity
 - Management capacity
- Alignment of missions, responsibilities, and resource authorities


Responsibilities for Iraqi Security Forces

Current

	Police	Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC)	Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF)
Policy	CPA	CJTF-7	CPA
Resourcing	CPA – salaries/equip CJTF-7 – equip/infrastructure (CERP)	CJTF-7	CPA
Training	CJTF-7 – instructors and trainers CPA – civ-pol	CJTF-7	CPA – Coalition Military Advisory Training Team CJTF-7 –embedded trainers
Mentoring	CJTF-7	CJTF-7	CPA – Coalition Military Advisory Training Team CJTF-7 – MSC mentors
Operational Employment	MOI – tasks/roles CJTF-7 – mentor/joint patrols	CJTF-7	CJTF-7


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JS 1.4 (a)




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JS 1.4 (a)



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Date: DEC 03 2014

JS 1.4 (a)



Conclusion

Unity of Command is the key to success

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OSD Policy/J-5
3 Feb 2004
12:00 PM

Iraqi Police: Reconciling Elkenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments


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Proposed way ahead:

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EYES ONLY

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IAW EO 13526, Section 3.5
Date: DEC 03 2014



From the Desk of
Paul Wolfowitz

2/3/04

→ Sec Def -

I dictated this
after this morning's
phone call.

PW

EYES ONLY

EYES ONLY

MEMO TO: Secretary Rumsfeld

DATE: February 3, 2004

FROM: Paul Wolfowitz

SUBJECT: Bremer's Situational Awareness

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
Authority: EO 13526
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS
Date: DEC 03 2014

Don,

Thanks for pushing back on Jerry this morning about his repeated insinuations that your "staff had misinformed you."

We do need to get as much ground truth as possible concerning facts. That was precisely the purpose of sending out the Eikenberry team. They probably know more now about the security situation than any of us, including Sanchez and Bremer. (One of their observations is that Bremer's main contact with the division commanders comes when they visit Baghdad. Apparently (I have no personal knowledge on this point), Jerry rarely visits them in the field.)

[REDACTED]

As for Baghdad, there is more CPA involvement there, mainly thanks to Bernie Kerrick's successor, Steve Casteel, his Deputy, a British policeman named Doug Brand, and Jim Steele, Bremer's advisor. They have very few people working for them and even in Baghdad most of the work is still being done by U.S. military police, many of them reservists. For example, when I visited a police station in Baghdad on Sunday, there were 8 or 9 U.S. Army MPs and Civil Affairs personnel working there and no one from CPA. In Mosul, we visited a police station that Dave Petraeus has stood up. It is much better equipped and professional-looking than the still very primitive situation we encountered in Baghdad.

[REDACTED]

EYES ONLY

JS 1.4 (a)

DoS

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COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

February 3, 2004

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: L. Paul Bremer III *W213*

SUBJECT: Public Information Program Using Iraq Survey Group (ISG) Documents

Recently, the ISG Deputy Director agreed with CPA officials in principle to allow, on a case-by-case basis, the release of selected documents to CPA for use in an information program. This is an important decision as ISG controls a significant percentage of former regime documents related to human rights atrocities. Access to these documents provides us with a significant opportunity to educate the international community about the egregious nature of the crimes committed by Saddam Hussein's regime as well as to address the Iraqi peoples' interest in learning the whole truth about the former dictatorship.

I intend to ask the CJTF-7 and CPA chief spokespersons to travel to Qatar to discuss immediate establishment of a systematic process to give CPA access to ISG-held documents as they become releasable. As my Office of Human Rights and Transitional Justice has access to search for relevant ISG documents through a computerized database, ISG officials and our spokespersons must develop a process for immediate public release of particular documents selected. This process would include safeguards to ensure that no document is used that would prejudice efforts to build cases for the Iraqi Special Tribunal, raise other legal issues, or adversely affect intelligence operations.

We will keep you informed of further developments.

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Date: DEC 03 2014

February 3, 2004

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TO: Jerry Bremer

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CC: Gen. Dick Myers
Paul Wolfowitz
Doug Feith


FROM: Donald Rumsfeld *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Iraqi Police Training

You told me I was being misinformed by my staff. I checked. I keep getting the same story. Maybe you ought to check with your staff and see if you have correct and current information.

For example, I am again being told that "most of the police training outside of Baghdad is being done by the military with CERP funds."

I am still being told that "much of the training in Baghdad is by the military people who have been certified by the civilian trainers."



JS 1.4 (a)

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UPON REMOVAL OF ATTACHMENT(S)
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My recommendation is that you sit down with your CPA police advisors. Get whoever has any voice on police in a room, and see if we can get to ground truth.

Doug Feith and Skip Sharp produced the attached paper as a possible solution off of our phone conversation today. It would be helpful and possibly save us two or three iterations if you think through what I said and the attached paper, and then meet with your folks to see if in fact we can get closer to the same set of facts.

Thanks.

Attach.
2/3/04 Policy/J-5 paper: Iraqi Police: Reconciling Eikenberry Assessment and Bremer Comments

DHR:dh
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Please respond by _____

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
COALITION PROVISIONAL AUTHORITY
BAGHDAD

3 February 2004

MEMO FOR: Secretary Rumsfeld

FROM: Paul Bremer <signed>

SUBJECT: Security Assessment



I have only just this morning received a copy of Gen. Eikenberry's report to you on security forces. On the whole the team has done a good job of finding areas for improvement. However, before today's PC I wanted you to be aware of two issues on which I disagree.

I do not agree with the plan to reduce the Iraqi Armed Forces to a single division. Such a decision essentially overturns everything we have said to the Iraqi people about our intention to produce an army for Iraq's legitimate defensive needs. And it undercuts our consistent message that we want Iraqi security forces to assume responsibility for Iraq's security.

The paper seems to assume that the army will be built to a larger size in later years. My advisors and I consider this unlikely. The Iraqis are inherently suspicious of their army. Their budget will not permit large scale spending on it even if they were so inclined. Thus, the consequence of a decision to drastically shrink the army is to ensure that the US acquires the responsibility for Iraqi security for an indefinite period. This in turn has major implications for our force presence in Iraq for years to come. Such a decision may well serve America's interests in Iraq and the region. But it is too important to be arrived at on the basis of a budgetary proposal.

I do not agree with placing the Iraqi police program under the military command, nor should the coalition commander be responsible for supervising the Ministry of Interior and establishing the Ministry of Defense.

The Chief of Mission who replaces me must have overall policy supervision of the police program. He must oversee the development of the police training program and ensure that it is integrated into the overall plans for Iraqi security forces. This work should be done by a senior civilian advisor to the Ministry of Interior reporting to the Chief of Mission. That advisor should set the training standards, establish spending priorities and manage the training process. Finally, he should provide political and policy guidance to

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the implementers of the policy, to the Ministry of Interior and to Iraqi political leaders. These are not matters to be left to the military.

Of course the US army has a lot to offer in helping with the police. It has done great work helping with equipment delivery, logistics, recruiting and in-field training. No doubt we need to improve the system we have followed since September whereby the coalition forces provide support to the police program. We need more police advisors and better leadership training.

I recommend that we tighten coordination between the civilian-police oversight of police and specific development functions performed by the coalition commander by placing a deputy to the MOI senior advisor within CJTF (and its follow-on command). There the deputy can see to it that military support functions receive adequate priority, ensure they are harmonized with civilian standards, and coordinate the military's piece with the larger process.

There is another reason I believe it would be unwise to subordinate the entire civilian police development program to our military command. It would convey to the Iraqis the opposite of the principle of civilian standards, rules and accountability for the police.

Finally, it would be a serious mistake to give the coalition commander responsibility for establishing the Ministry of Defense. The roles and missions of the MOD are extremely sensitive politically. Work is well under way, quietly, with leading Iraqi politicians, under Dave Gompert, to work these issues. Candidates to work in the Ministry have already been chosen. Work is being started to identify Minister candidates. These are not matters which any Chief of Mission should leave to the US military. Moreover, a vital part of our message for the new Iraq is that the military is under civilian control. This message should not be in any way fuzzed up.

My apologies for writing in such haste, but again I had not seen the report until this morning.

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